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RESTORING THE BALANCING TEST: A BETTER APPROACH 
TO FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 




Fair use analyses are overly vague and abstract. While the Copyright 
Act established four factors for courts to consider when determining if an 
alleged infringer’s use of copyrighted work is “fair”, these factors are not 
susceptible to easy interpretation. More importantly, once these factors 
have been interpreted, a trier of fact is instructed to balance these factors 
against each other. No effective method currently exists in guiding courts 
as to how to balance inherently disparate factors against each other, either 
in terms of intensity of the factors or how one factor might balance against 
another totally different factor. This article proposes a framework that 
would allow courts to interpret each of the four factors and then assign a 
grade of 1-4 for each factor. After each factor is graded, the values are in-
serted into the framework, which then performs the balancing and reaches a 
conclusion on fair use. Having an objective basis for reaching a fair use 
determination helps to eliminate result-oriented decisions and provides a 
firm ground of support for a court’s decision. 
  
 
 1. Assistant Professor, University of West Florida. I would like to thank Mathew Morrison for 
his enormously valuable feedback on an earlier draft of this Article. 
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RESTORING THE BALANCING TEST: A BETTER APPROACH 
TO FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 
CHARLIE PENROD, J.D. 
INTRODUCTION 
Little Johnny and Jimmy are brothers. Johnny is five years old and 
Jimmy is three. Johnny and Jimmy are playing with their trucks on the 
living room floor. Jimmy decides that he no longer likes the truck he has 
and reaches over to take Johnny’s truck. Johnny quickly puts it out of reach 
and tells Jimmy, “It’s mine – you can’t have it!” Jimmy looks to his mother 
and begins to cry uncontrollably and says, “But Mom – I want it!” Mom 
looks at Johnny and says, “Look Johnny – you are bigger and you can play 
with something else. He is too small to understand that some things belong 
to others. Just give him your truck and go find something else to do.” John-
ny hesitantly gives the truck to Jimmy before pitifully saying, “This isn’t 
fair!” 
Maybe it is fair and maybe it is not. Who can tell? Mom has decided 
what is fair subjectively without any real objective standard. Perhaps she 
was simply tired of hearing little Jimmy cry. Perhaps she felt that Johnny 
should not be bothered by losing the truck to Jimmy. Maybe she thinks that 
Johnny simply should not have complete ownership over the truck, and he 
should be willing to share with those who do not have what he has. Either 
way, Johnny is left wondering why life and Mom have treated him unfairly, 
while Jimmy gets to gleefully play with something that is not rightfully his. 
The same dilemma strikes judges and juries when deciding whether or 
not a second person can appropriate someone else’s copyrighted property 
as their own. Just like Mom really had no bright line basis to determine 
what was “fair”, neither do triers of fact.2 And, that is a problem. The law 
allows others to take copyrighted original works only if the use is a “fair” 
one.3 Sometimes, society is better off by allowing others to use copyrighted 
works as their own, just as Mom believed her family’s life would be better 
off by allowing Jimmy to have the truck. But, without some justification 
for why some uses are fair and some are not, litigants could be left with the 
sense that the decision was simply an arbitrary decision against them. Cop-
yright law, and Mom’s decision making, would be much better off if some 
 
 2. A determination of fair use uses a statutory balancing test rather than a bright line rule. See 17 
U.S.C. § 107 (2012); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994). 
 3. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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framework existed to more objectively determine what is and what is not 
fair. 
This Article seeks to provide triers of fact with a new framework to 
analyze fair use in an attempt to reach more consistent and sound decisions. 
Part I explores the state of the law as it pertains to fair use. Part II high-
lights the fundamental deficiencies with the current fair use analysis and 
introduces a new, but complementary, framework and a discussion of how 
triers of fact are to best use it to reach logical resolutions. Part III imple-
ments the framework in the context of previously decided cases to view 
how the framework either supports the Court’s decision or contradicts it. 
Finally, the Conclusion summarizes the results. Once again, the goal of this 
framework is not to recreate fair use jurisprudence, but instead to provide a 
viable mechanism to explain a court’s reasoning. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Copyright Basics 
The U.S. Constitution grants the Congress the power to “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Rights and Dis-
coveries.4“ Otherwise known as the Copyright Clause, this provision within 
Article I lays out a grant of federal power to regulate certain intellectual 
property rights to create a system to adequately promote science.5 Rather 
than having to rely on its regulatory powers through the Interstate Com-
merce Clause, the Copyright Clause gives Congress a direct means by 
which to provide authors protection from unfair uses of their creative 
works.6 
Of course, there are limitations. The Copyright Clause itself restricts 
copyright protection for “limited times”, which, as of works currently cre-
ated, lasts for 70 years after the author’s death for individuals, if the author 
is an individual.7 Copyright protection lasts anywhere from 95-120 years 
for works created by a corporate entity.8 Further, the Copyright Act only 
confers protections to authors whose works are fixed in a tangible medium 
of expression.9 A crucial corollary to this proposition is that ideas are not 
 
 4. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
 5. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (stating that a key aspect of the Copyright 
Clause involves “rewarding authors for their creative labor”).  
 6. Id. at 212 (holding that Congress, and not the courts, is tasked with how best to implement the 
Copyright Clause’s objectives). 
 7. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). 
 8. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2012). 
 9. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
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copyrightable and can be appropriated without running afoul of copyright 
laws.10 
Take for example the successful animated film Cars. Cars was re-
leased in 2006 and features an animated, talking red race car named Light-
ning McQueen.11 The film centers on Lightning McQueen’s quest to win 
the Piston Cup in the face of heavy competition from his peers.12 Similarly, 
Roary, the Racing Car is a television show that began in 2007.13 It features 
Roary, who is also an animated, talking red racecar.14 Roary teaches les-
sons to small children through various adventures as he races on the Silver 
Hatch Racing Circuit.15 The cars themselves are similar, but not identical, 
and the voices used and adventures of the cars are different.16 At first blush, 
it might appear to the untrained eye that Roary has committed some sort of 
copyright infringement against Cars. However, what was taken, if any-
thing, was the idea of using a red talking animated racecar as the center-
piece of a children’s entertainment show. Nothing fixed in a medium was 
copied – only the idea for such a show was appropriated. Under the Copy-
right Act, this is legally permissible and Cars has no legal remedy to enjoin 
Roary from the use of this idea. This stems partly from the fact that the law 
seeks only to protect the specific form of the work produced and not the 
idea behind the work.17 Otherwise, giving monopoly power to an idea 
would stifle innovation, limit creative outlets, and reduce the panoply of 
creative works available for consumers. 
Originality is the fountainhead for copyright protection.18 In order to 
be eligible for copyright protection, the work must actually be created by 
the author and possess some minimum level of creativity.19 The Copyright 
Act itself provides an illustrative, not exhaustive, list of original works of 
authorship that have copyright protection.20 As one would expect, literary 
works, movies, sound recordings, and paintings are considered original 
works of authorship.21 Other works, such as dance, pantomime, architectur-
al works, and photographs also are protected.22 On the other hand, facts are 
 
 10. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); See also Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 at 219 (2003). 
 11. CARS (Walt Disney Pictures 2006). 
 12. Id. 
 13.  See generally ROARY, THE RACING CAR (PBS Sprout 2007). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
 18. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co, Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991). 
 19. Id. at 345. 
 20. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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not copyrightable, except that a unique compilation of facts does retain 
some copyright protection.23 For example, the statement “the sun is 93 
million miles from Earth” is a non-copyrightable fact, but a compilation of 
terms describing animal groups, arranged based on their “lyrical and poetic 
potential,” does have some copyright protection.24 
Prior to 1989, works that had not been formally registered received no 
copyright protection and infringers were immune from suits for infringe-
ment occurring prior to registration.25 Now, copyright registration is no 
longer necessary to protect substantive rights, but it is a procedural pre-
requisite that must be completed before a lawsuit is filed26 In other words, 
copyright registration is “required for litigation but not for the existence of 
copyright.”27 
In any copyright infringement case, there is what amounts to a three-
step analysis that must be performed to resolve any dispute. First, copyright 
holders can, and often do, license or grant consent to third parties for the 
limited use of their works. The scope of the ability to use copyrighted 
works is dependent upon the licensing agreement.28 This is an issue of con-
tractual interpretation as to what the intent of the parties is. If the use by the 
third party is included in the terms of the licensing agreement, the author 
has contractually consented to waive his/her copyright and the author no 
longer has a substantive right to sue under copyright law.29 Additionally, 
copyright holders can make their works “open source,” by explicitly waiv-
ing some or all copyrights in their otherwise protected work.30 Thus, any 
use of these works by third parties does not constitute copyright infringe-
ment despite any actual copying, so long as the user complies with the 
terms of the open source license.31 Websites such as Creative Commons are 
 
 23. Feist, 499 U.S. at 344 (1991). 
 24. Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 467 (2nd Cir. 1995). 
 25. The U.S. became a signatory to the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, which 
among other things changed copyright law to make registration permissive rather than mandatory. The 
Act became effective on March 1, 1989. See Pub. L. No. 100–568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1989). For further 
discussion, see Society of Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29, 44 (1st Cir. 
2012). 
 26. See 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2012); 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012). 
 27. Neri v. Monroe, 726 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 28. See Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Open Source Definition, OPENSOURCE, http://www.opensource.org/osd.html (last visited 
September 1, 2014). 
 31. This is prevalent in the software industry, where open source licenses essentially grant a 
royalty-free license to users that allows users to modify and/or use the software so long as certain 
conditions are followed. Debra Brubaker Burns, Titans and Trolls Enter the Open-Source Arena, 5 
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 33, 33–34 (2013). Some of these conditions might include a requirement to 
provide copyright notices and/or to make the source code readily obtainable to other users. Maxim V. 
Tsotsorin, Open Source Software Compliance: The Devil is Not So Black as He is Painted, 29 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 559, 559–60 (2013). 
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devoted to developing tailor-made copyright licenses that allow authors to 
make their works completely open source or open source with re-
strictions.32 Internet sites such as Flickr, for example, give users the ability 
to declare their works to be open source for the public’s use.33 
In the absence of a licensing agreement, courts must then consider the 
next question: has the infringer appropriated anything copyrightable into 
his/her work?34 In other words, has the infringer copied, distributed, or 
publicly displayed any part of a fixed, original work created by the au-
thor?35 In most cases, this is easy to determine. It is beyond debate that 
Vanilla Ice’s song “Ice Ice Baby”, for example, uses the opening beat from 
Queen’s “Under Pressure.”36 The two songs sound almost identical at their 
inceptions and only upon very close attention can someone distinguish the 
two.37 Since musical beats and arrangements are original, creative, and 
fixed in a medium, Queen should have the right to prevent Vanilla Ice from 
appropriating any part of its work. 
More recently, the well-known A&M Records copyright infringement 
case involved massive amounts of direct copying of millions of songs on 
the Napster peer-to-peer network.38 Songs retain copyright protection even 
in electronic form, and there was simply no doubt that direct copying in 
violation of the original author’s copyrights was rampant.39 As a result, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found Napster to be legally respon-
sible for the copyright infringement occurring through its website.40 
On the other hand, songs that sound vaguely familiar to, but not iden-
tical to, an original work are more difficult questions more appropriately 
resolved by a jury rather than on summary judgment. For example, the 
band Loomis and the Lust has filed suit against the pop star Jessie J for her 
 
 32. See CREATIVE COMMONS, http://www.creativecommons.org (last visited September 1, 2014). 
 33. See FLICKR.COM, http://www.flickr.com (last visited September 1, 2014).  
 34. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012); 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 35. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 36. To listen to those songs, see YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rog8ou-ZepE (last 
visited September 1, 2014) (“Ice Ice Baby”); YOUTUBE, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CnTFNsmToHg (last visited September 1, 2014) (“Under Pres-
sure”). 
 37. In an early 1990s interview to MTV, Vanilla Ice defended his infringement on the ground that 
there is a slight bridge between the two main baselines, whereas Under Pressure is simply a replaying of 
the hook over and over. While technically true, this does not take away from the fact that the rest of the 
sound is identical. To view the interview, see Vanilla Ice MTV Interview, YOUTUBE (June 17, 2012), 
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bid0AbLTcco (last visited September 1, 2014). 
 38. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 39. Id. at 1017.  
 40. Id. 
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song “Domino.”41 Loomis and the Lust’s song, “Bright Red Chords,” does 
sound vaguely familiar to the opening of “Domino,” but the level of simi-
larity is nowhere near the identical baselines in “Ice Ice Baby.” The thresh-
old question to be resolved is: has Jessie J actually copied protected work, 
or has she simply used a series of baseline chords (or facts) available to 
make a new work independent of the original? Those trained in the musical 
arts are far more equipped to make this determination than laypersons or 
attorneys, and whether or not infringement actually occurred lies in the 
province of expert witnesses.42 
B. Defining Fair Use 
Assuming a court finds that copyrightable material was used by an in-
fringer, the usual next step is to determine whether or not the use is a “fair 
use.”43 Fair use is a statutorily codified defense to infringement.44 Essen-
tially, Congress has determined that not all uses of copyrighted works 
should be impermissible. Using a smaller amount of the work to create a 
new one, for example, might be a fair use that society can and should toler-
ate.45 Or, if the infringer’s use of the original is transformed into a new 
work independent from the original without bad faith intent to blindly prof-
it from the author’s work, the law is more inclined to allow such appropria-
tions to happen.46 In other words, copyrighted works should not be totally 
impervious to infringement when the benefits to society outweigh the un-
 
 41. See Josh Grossberg, Jessie J Slapped with Copyright Infringement Suit Over “Domino”, 
E!ONLINE (June 28, 2012), http://www.eonline.com/news/326779/jessie-j-slapped-with-copyright-
infringement-suit-over-domino (last visited September 1, 2014). 
 42. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473–74 (2d Cir. 1946) (holding that expert witnesses may 
determine similarities and infringement, but not necessarily illicit copying or appropriating). 
 43. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 44. Some commentators also contend that there is an ethical component to fair use as well. See, 
e.g., Rebecca Pressman, Fair Use: Law, Ethics and Librarians, 47 JOURNAL OF LIBRARY 
ADMINISTRATION 89, 89 (2008), Pressman argues that fair use is more than just a legal construct that 
constrains the behavior of infringers and that fair use also has an ethical component which might give 
rise to additional rights and obligations over and above the restrictions of Section 107 of the Copyright 
Act. See also Michael Murray, DIOS MIO – The KISS Principle of the Ethical Approach to Copyright 
and Right of Publicity Law, 14 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 89, 89–92 (2013). Michael Murray argues that 
the ethical responsibilities of authors to refrain from using others copyrighted works gives rise to an 
extra-legal obligation he terms “DIOS MIO” (Don’t Include Other’s Stuff or Modify It Obviously). 
 45. See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2569 (2009). 
Samuelson notes that society as a whole benefits when subsequent authors are allowed to make fair uses 
of copyrighted work.) See also Steve P. Calandrillo and Ewa M. Davison, The Dangers of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act: Much Ado About Nothing?, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 349, 403–04 (2008). 
Calandrillo and Davison argue that in light of the fact that fair use balances the need of society to obtain 
creative works with the author’s right to earn revenue, an important goal of copyright law in general 
should be to ensure original works are delivered to a mass audience.  
 46. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 599–600 (1994) (finding that song 
parody’s commercial nature did not creation presumption of unfair use). 
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fairness to the original author.47 Another explanation propounded by 
Pressman is that the fair use defense saves time and money by eliminating 
unnecessary individual negotiations for insignificant uses that are too minor 
to require a full-fledged licensing agreement.48 Indeed, Congress has rec-
ognized that some specific and relatively insubstantial public displays of 
copyrighted work are, by definition, not infringing, thus eliminating the 
need for licensing agreements for such uses.49 
Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides for a balancing test of four 
factors to be examined for fair use.50 No one factor is determinative, but 
instead courts are expected to engage in a balancing test where the totality 
of all four factors is weighed equally.51 The House of Representatives spe-
cifically envisioned a rule of reason, case-by-case analysis for all fair use 
and rejected strict definitions.52 Presumably, this was done because original 
works are wildly different, and works should be considered in light of their 
market context, creativity, and customary uses rather than a one-size-fits-all 
approach. 
While the statute lays out four enumerated factors to be considered, 
courts have widely diverging methods by which these factors are interpret-
ed and applied. No uniform test exists for fair use, or even more problemat-
ically, how best to weigh these together. Martine Courant Rife aptly de-
describes the fair use analysis as “a chimera, something mystical and even 
dangerous if you stake your scholarly life on it.”53 Rife does note that while 
there are some boundaries that can be relied on, none of those boundaries 
are bright lines.54 Neil Weinstock Netanel describes the situation as “hope-
 
 47. See David Faguendes, Efficient Copyright Infringement, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1804 (2013). 
Faguendes argues that some instances of copyright infringement are efficient and enhance social wel-
fare, particularly where gaining permission to use the work is “untenable” or where the social benefits 
to the infringement outweigh the costs of that infringement. Fagundes’ new construct of efficient in-
fringement is not simply a re-working of fair use; rather, his idea of efficient copyright infringement 
seeks to go beyond fair use to create a new subset of works that are immune from copyright infringe-
ment. 
 48. Pressman, supra note 44, at 92. 
 49. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2012) (e.g. Displays of movies in a face-to-face classroom – 17 U.S.C. § 
110(1) (2012); Musical, non-profit performances – 17 U.S.C § 110(3) (2012); Public displays of radio 
or television transmissions in small businesses and small restaurants – 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2012)). 
 50. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 51. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994). 
 52. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448–50 n.31 (1984). 
 53. Martine Courant Rife, The Fair Use Doctrine: History, Application, and Implications for 
(New Media) Writing Teachers, 24 COMPUTERS AND COMPOSITION 154, 164 (2007). 
 54. Id. at 164. 
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lessly unpredictable.”55 Similarly, David Nimmer describes the ability to 
reach consistent fair use decisions as “a fairy tale.”56 
Section 107 provides for the following four fair use factors: 
1. The purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit education 
purposes; 
2. The nature of the copyrighted work 
3. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
4. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work.57 
Courts have struggled to devise uniform interpretations for each of 
these factors. The Supreme Court has yet to give lower courts specific in-
structions as to how to balance these disparate factors against each other in 
a manner that is consistent with the purpose of copyright laws. 
C. The Supreme Court’s Fair Use Decisions 
Since the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, the Supreme Court 
has announced a triumvirate of decisions attempting to define the bounda-
ries of the fair use defense. They are not always consistent with one another 
and do not mesh together in a clear, systematic manner. Instead, the three 
contrasting opinions only add to the incoherency of the fair use doctrine. 
In Sony v. Universal, the Court held that video tape recorders (VTRs) 
were not liable for contributory copyright infringement when private par-
ties used these recorders to copy broadcast television programming.58 The 
Court, for the first meaningful time, applied the fair use factors to deter-
mine whether or not these VTRs improperly infringed on the copyright 
authors.59 The Court’s fair use analysis indicated that some factors might be 
elevated in the levels of importance. First, the Court took special note of 
the first factor – the purpose of the use.60 The Court, staying true to the 
words of Section 107(1), discussed whether or not the use was of a com-
mercial nature.61 However, the Court gave a legal presumption to the com-
 
 55. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 716 
(2011). 
 56. David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 287 (2003). 
 57. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 58.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 448–49. 
 61. Id. 
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merciality of the use, stating that when a device is “used to make copies for 
a commercial or profit-making purpose, such use would be presumptively 
be unfair.”62 The Court further found the contrary presumption would be 
true as well – a finding of non-commerciality gives rise to a presumption of 
fairness.63 The statute does not mandate or even suggest such a presump-
tion; rather, the Court viewed the commerciality of the use as one that 
transcends other factors. 
This is particularly noteworthy when considering the short shrift the 
Court gives to factors two and three. While conceding that both of these 
factors militate in favor of an unfair use, the fact that VTR copying is at its 
core a noncommercial activity when done in the home not only outweighed 
but also rendered practically irrelevant the calculus of those two factors.64 
No real “weighing” occurred between these factors – one was simply 
deemed to be presumptively more important on the issue of fair use. 
The Court then discussed the fourth factor – the effect on the copy-
righted work. The Court made it clear that the fourth factor, unlike the sec-
ond or the third, does matter and should be weighed against the first 
factor.65 Specifically, the Court found that, for noncommercial uses, there 
may be an unfair impairment of an author’s copyrights if the use affects the 
potential market for the work or if the use affects future incentives to create 
original works.66 In the end, the Court found no harmful effect in time-
shifting, or simply watching a program at a different time that when it nor-
mally airs, and therefore the VTRs could successfully assert the fair use 
defense.67 
The second case, Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises,68 changed the 
overall thrust of Sony. There, a magazine, The Nation, printed excerpts 
from an unpublished memoir on Gerald Ford without the permission of the 
copyright holder, Harper & Row.69 The Court first noted that the four fair 
use factors are not exclusive; however, those in fact were the only four 
considered.70 The Court backed away from the commercial/noncommercial 
 
 62. Id. at 449. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 449–50. As noted by the Court, television shows are likely to be of a creative nature. 
Further, there is no doubt that the entire copyrighted work is being copied. The Court noted this but 
ultimately disregarded that fact in the fair use analysis.  
 65. Id. at 450. 
 66. Id. at 450–51. The Court implied that the effect of the use is not important when the use is 
commercial, stating that “noncommercial uses are a different matter.” Id. at 451. So, the effect of the 
use would only be weighed when the purpose of the use was noncommercial.  
 67. Id. at 456. 
 68. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 539–42 (1985). 
 69. Id. at 542. 
 70. Id. at 560–61. 
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presumption by instead holding that, “the fact that a publication was com-
mercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh 
against a finding of fair use.”71 Even though news reporting could be con-
sidered noncommercial, the Court still found this factor weighted against a 
finding of fair use because The Nation essentially stole these excerpts and 
deprived Harper & Row of the benefits of being the first to publish the 
memoirs.72 No elevation in importance was given to the purpose as it was 
in Sony. 
As for the nature, the Court found that although factual works have 
less protection that works of fiction, there were some “expressive” ele-
ments in the memoirs that were more creative in nature.73 Further, the fact 
that the work was unpublished was an important aspect of its nature that 
weighed against a finding of fair use.74 As for amount, although a relatively 
small amount of the entire memoir was taken and reprinted, the most im-
portant or core parts of the work were the ones actually copied. The Court 
noted that because the important parts of the work were taken, the amount 
factor tended to favor a finding of infringement.75 
Lastly, the Court found a substantial effect on the market of the un-
published memoir since The Nation was able to get these excerpts to the 
public first. Importantly, the Court here announced a clear departure from 
the commercial presumption in Sony by holding, “[t]he last factor is un-
doubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”76 The Court held 
that a finding of clear-cut, actual damages is not necessary; instead, an 
author need only to show a reasonable probability exists that the infringe-
ment leads to adverse effect before the burden shifts to the defendant to 
show the revenue loss would have occurred even without the infringe-
ment.77 
The final of the three cases is Campbell v. Acuff-Rose.78 In that case, 
the group 2 Live Crew wrote a song titled “Pretty Woman”, which they 
intended to be a parody version of Roy Orbison’s song “Oh, Pretty Wom-
an”. The music and beat of both songs are very similar and there was little 
 
 71. Id. at 562. The language that commercialism “tends to weigh” against fair use, rather than 
being presumptively against fair use, is certainly a departure from Sony. This implies that the purpose 
factor is simply to be balanced against the others, since all of the factors generally tend to weigh one 
way or the other, whereas a presumption implies that the other factors must be of sufficient weight to 
overrule a finding of infringement.  
 72. Id. at 562–63. 
 73. Id. at 563–64. 
 74. Id. at 564. 
 75. Id. at 565–66. 
 76. Id. at 566.  
 77. Id. 
 78. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994). 
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doubt that 2 Live Crew took copyrightable material from Acuff-Rose, the 
copyright holder for “Oh, Pretty Woman.”79 Importantly, the Campbell 
Court clearly departed from the holdings of Sony and Harper & Row that 
either the commerciality or the effect on the market is given special consid-
eration. Rather, the Court stated, “Nor may the four statutory factors be 
treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the results 
weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”80 
For the first time after 1976, the Supreme Court introduced the con-
cept of the “transformative use” as a key component of the purpose of the 
use. Those works that take the original and transform, add to, or otherwise 
modify it for a “further purpose or different character” are more likely to be 
fair uses.81 In departing from Sony, without expressly overruling it, the 
Court held that the more transformative the work is, the less commercial-
ism is significant.82 This is a far cry from Sony, where a finding of com-
mercialism gave rise to a presumption of unfairness.83 
The Court then applied the transformative use doctrine to 2 Live 
Crew’s parody of “Oh, Pretty Woman”. The Court had very little trouble 
finding that a parody transforms an original into a new work of humor and 
criticism. Continuing on, the Court found that even though this factor 
weighed in favor of fair use, no presumptive weight should elevate this 
factor over the others.84 
Next, the Court noted that Orbison’s song is clearly creative and at the 
core of what should be protected by copyright – however, the Court noted 
that due to the unique nature of parody, this fact “is not much help in this 
case.”85 Next, the Court found that the analysis used for the amount and 
substantiality is different when judging parodies, given that parodies by 
their very nature must appropriate material from the original to get the par-
ody point across. For parodies, then, the analysis to be used is whether or 
not “no more than necessary was taken,” rather than looking at how much 
was taken in absolute terms.86 For the fourth factor, the effect on the value 
of the original, the Court held that the record was incomplete in that no 
evidence was submitted on the core issue of whether or not the rap version 
 
 79. Id. at 574. 
 80. Id. at 578. 
 81. Id. at 580. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 580. The Court did hold, however, that where no transformative purpose exists, the 
“extent of its commerciality loom[s] larger.”  
 84. Id. at 583–84. 
 85. Id. at 586. However, this problem is remediated by the new framework proposed. A grade of 
“4” could still be assigned to the nature without effecting the court’s final determination of fair use.  
 86. Id. at 589.  
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would have any impact on the market for the original.87 Crucially, the 
Court did not mention Harper & Row’s holding that the fourth factor is the 
most important, and combining that with its holding that all factors are to 
be explored, leads to the inevitable conclusion that Campbell declined to 
follow Harper & Row on that point. 
D. Interpretations of the Fair Use Factors 
While the Supreme Court has given general guidance as to the mean-
ing of the four factors, other courts and commentators have attempted to fill 
in the missing gaps. As noted earlier, the two main components inherent 
within the purpose of the use is whether the use is commercial and whether 
the use is transformative. The commercial/nonprofit dichotomy is explicit 
in the text of Section 107, but there is no statutory definition for a commer-
cial use. Granted, certain illustrative noncommercial purposes such as news 
reporting, teaching, scholarship, etc. appear in Section 107, but no over-
arching definition as to what is and what is not commercial exists in the 
statute.88 
First, monetary gain is not a necessary prerequisite to a finding of 
commerciality.89 Instead, what is crucial is “whether the user stands to 
profit from the exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the 
customary price.”90 Eric Gorman notes that commerciality often turns on if 
the infringing use was “primarily for public benefit, or for private commer-
cial gain.”91 To the contrary, nonprofit uses are more likely to be deemed 
fair.92 
Matthew Sag devised categories of commercial and noncommercial 
uses as those terms are understood by parties to litigation.93 He defined 
commercial uses as those that used the original work as “part of a commer-
cial product or service or as an intermediate step to creating a commercial 
product or service”.94  On the other hand, Sag categorizes noncommercial 
uses as uses that include are either personal, educational, research-based, or 
for public communication.95 This categorization is helpful in that it allows 
 
 87. Id. at 593. 
 88. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 89. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). 
 90. Id. Presumably, the customary price involves some sort of licensing agreement.  
 91. Eric D. Gorman, Who Gets the Last Laugh? Satire, Doctrine of Fair Use, and Copywrong 
Infringement, 29 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 205, 208 (2010). 
 92. Matthew W. Wallace, Analyzing Fair Use Claims: A Quantitative and Paradigmatic Ap-
proach, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 121, 134 (1992). 
 93. Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 56–61 (2012). 
 94. Id. at 61. 
 95. Id. 
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courts to pigeonhole purposes into particular categories in the fair use anal-
ysis. One problem inherent with such categorization is that some uses have 
multiple purposes, even if one predominates over the other. 
Since Campbell, transformative uses are just as important, if not much 
more important, than whether the use is commercial. As Campbell noted, a 
work should have “new expression, meaning or message” to be considered 
transformative.96 Sag notes that an exact definition of transformative uses is 
difficult, giving examples including substantial copying, recontextualiza-
tion, and even nonexpressive uses that were held to be transformative us-
es.97 So, both the motivation behind the work and the potential customer 
base the transformative work serves are key ingredients to determine what 
is transformative. 
The nature of the copyrighted work revolves around the factual-fiction 
distinction, with greater copyright protection for creative works such as 
works of fiction rather than factual databases.98 Essentially, the inquiry 
boils down to whether or not the work is creative or informational.99 This is 
in line with the goals of copyright protection in the first place; original, 
creative works lie within the core of copyright protection and it is this core 
that should be protected to incentivize further creative works. Informational 
works, or works based on factual events, do not require as much creative 
talent. Giving monopoly power over works that are more grounded in fact 
prohibits others from disseminating this information in other forms. 
The amount and substantiality requirement, as noted in Harper & 
Row, includes a discussion of both the absolute amount taken as well as 
whether or not the important portions of the work were copied.100 There 
 
 96. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
 97. Sag, supra note 93, at 56.  
 98. Brian Link, Drawing a Line in Alternate Universes: Exploring the Inadequacies of the Current 
Four-Factor Fair Use Test through Chanslash, 33 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 139, 154 (2010). Link de-
scribes the inquiry on nature as a “factional-fictional spectrum”, suggesting that courts afford more 
protection to works that are more akin to fictional novels. This recognizes that not all works fit nicely 
into a fictional or factual category, such that some works are more factual than others.  
 99. Sag, supra note 93, at 61. 
 100. When characters from a work are taken, courts have used either the “sufficiently delineated 
test” or the “story being told test”. See Link, supra note 98, at 156–159. Link describes the sufficiently 
delineated test, developed first in the Second Circuit, as one where courts examine “the detail in which 
the previous works developed the physical and emotional characteristics, character traits, and the inter-
relationships of the characters.” Id. at 156–57. In other words, works that use characters from a previous 
work, such as a sequel, fairly use those characters if the original had not already fleshed out their basic 
personality and physical characteristics. On the other hand, the “story being told” test greatly limits 
which characters are copyrightable. Only those characters that are the main, leading characters that tell 
the story are protected under this test. See Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 216 F.2d 
945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954) (“If the character is only the chessman in the game of telling the story he is not 
within the area of protection afforded by copyright.”). As Link aptly observes, “Under this narrowly 
drawn test, very few characters would be protected outside the original work”. Link supra note 93, at 
159. 
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currently exists no baseline threshold, above which leads to an inference of 
infringement. Instead, a determination of when too much is taken often 
depends on the individual work itself. For example, as discussed above, 
Campbell specifically stressed in the context of parodies that an absolute 
amount taken is inappropriate; instead, courts are to look at whether no 
more than necessary was taken for parodies.101 Contrast the holding in 
Campbell with Harper & Row, where a mere 300 words, or 13 percent of 
the copyrighted article, were taken, yet this was found to militate in favor 
of infringement given that the important parts of the memoir were taken.102 
The final factor, the potential effect on the market or value of the 
work, focuses on whether or not the infringing work will compete against 
the original. Sag summarizes the effect factor as “an inquiry into competi-
tive injury or lost sales.”103 Competitive injury could include a situation 
where a competitor’s overall viability is increased, not necessarily at the 
expense of but rather because of, an unauthorized copying of a protected 
work. Other possible effects include market substitution or demand sup-
pression that adversely impacts the original author’s potential market.104 In 
other words, does the infringing work replace the market for the original so 
that customers buy the infringing work instead of the original? This obvi-
ously also involves lost sale and revenues. If the infringing work competes 
with the original in the marketplace, customers may opt to obtain the in-
fringing work instead of the original. This is precisely the fear encountered 
in A&M Records case in that users could potentially download music for 
free instead of purchasing it legally. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Problems With the Current Method of Fair Use Decision-Making 
Balancing tests are notoriously difficult to apply or predict, with liti-
gants left at the mercy of the trier of fact as to how factors are balanced. In 
fact, the uncertainty in how the fair use balancing test will be analyzed may 
drive litigation that otherwise would never occur. The very unpredictability 
and vagueness of fair use could lead both authors and infringers to firmly 
stand their ground with the belief, reasonable or not, that the balancing test 
will be resolved in their favor. At the other end of the spectrum, Rife notes 
that the Supreme Court’s inability to clearly stake out the contours of fair 
use creates an overly cautious fear of infringement that results in a sizable 
 
 101. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 589 (1994). 
 102. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565–66 (1985). 
 103. Id. at 64.  
 104. Link, supra note 98, at 159.  
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reduction of legally fair uses that may be otherwise be educationally bene-
ficial in universities.105  This is far less likely to happen in situation where 
the rule is clear, with only room for interpretation at the margins. Potential 
fair users of copyrighted works might be simply unwilling to fight for their 
right to use works when faced with the massive potential liability if their 
fair use calculus is incorrect.106 Thus, for many casual “infringers”, the 
benefit of posting a random video on YouTube is certainly not worth the 
risk of fighting a copyright takedown notice where the user derives no sig-
nificant revenue from that use. 
Courts, predictably, are all over the map when it comes to performing 
the balancing test. As seen above, some emphasize the first factor, others 
the fourth. Some gloss over or minimize the importance of one or more 
factors. The danger in allowing a free-for-all balancing test is the tempta-
tion to minimize those factors in favor of the adverse party and emphasize 
those in favor of the other.107 Intentional or not, the fair use balancing test 
is susceptible to allowing the trier of fact to cherry pick factors in favor of 
the winning litigant to achieve a result-driven decision rather than a purely 
analytical one.108 Balancing tests in particular have been targeted as unprin-
cipled, result-driven, and bad jurisprudence.109 
 
 105. Compare Id. at 168 with Rife, supra note 51, at 170–73. Rife persuasively argues that one 
cause of fair use fear is a lack of education. She advocates that fair use should be taught not only in 
“law” classes, but in writing classes as well, going so far as to advocate that fair use should be a learn-
ing outcome in writing classes where students are asked to critically apply the four factor tests in a 
variety of writing-based situations to compensate for the lack of clarity in education. This, of course, 
begs the questions as to exactly how best to educate on fair use when currently there is no uniform 
understanding of how to apply these factors. 
 106. David Faguendes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139, 151–53 (2009); James 
Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 887 
(2007).  
 107. See Laurie Stearns, Copy Wrong: Plagiarism, Process, Property and the Law, 80 CAL. L. REV. 
513, 531 (2004) (“With its emphasis on the four stated factors, fair use is an explicitly result-oriented 
doctrine”); Nimmer, supra note 56, at 281. Nimmer notes that courts make the fair use determination 
first, and then align the four factors to coincide with that determination. Nimmer describes the situation 
as one where, “the four factors fail to drive the analysis, but rather serve as convenient pegs on which to 
hang antecedent conclusions.” 
 108. Commentators see result-oriented rulings as undesirable when it appears as though the end 
result, and not the process by which the ruling is reached, is the driving force behind the ultimate reso-
lution. When rulings are unprincipled or done on a seemingly ad hoc basis, this gives rise to unaccepta-
ble result-driven rulings. John E. Simonett, The Use of the Term “Result-Oriented” to Characterize 
Appellate Decisions, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 187, 187 (1984). Others have gone so far as to say that 
result-driven jurisprudence is almost by definition unprincipled and problematic. Kyron Huigens, The 
Continuity of Justification Defenses, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 627, 692 (2009). As James Gordon (2004) 
succinctly puts it, ““A good result does not render the process lawful. Result-oriented jurisprudence is 
unprincipled and inconsistent with the rule of law”. James D. Gordon, “Acorns and Oaks: Implied 
rights of Action under the Securities Acts, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 62, 72 (2004). 
 109. See Jon D. Michaels, Symposium: Law at the Intersection of National Security, Privacy, and 
Technology, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 1435, 1473, n.171 (2010); Tung Yin, Procedural Due Process to De-
termine “Enemy Combatant” Status in the War on Terrorism, 73 TENN. L. REV. 351, 354 (2006) (bal-
ancing tests are susceptible to “result-oriented malleability”); Leonard Weintraub, Crime of the 
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More innocently, it is difficult in practice to weigh factors against 
each other without some underlying, objective standard. If the nature of the 
copyrighted work is creative but the amount used small, how do you weigh 
those? Do those two essentially negate each other or does one of those 
factors matter more than the other? As it stands now, there is no real guid-
ance from courts as to how to balance the factors in the most appropriate 
way. 
The more difficult question concerns the intensity of the factors. Sure-
ly the relative strength or weakness of the factors must come in to play in 
order to balance them together correctly. Putting a stone on each of the two 
sides of a scale does not mean it is balanced – if one stone is larger than the 
other, the scale will tip in that direction in spite of the fact each scale has 
the same number of stones. In the fair use analysis, one factor might strong-
ly weigh towards a finding for or against fair use, while other factors in the 
same case weakly support one way or the other. Undoubtedly, any balanc-
ing test needs to incorporate the concept of intensity, so that a strong factor 
outweighs a weak factor. But, the problem remains that no existing frame-
work allows practitioners or courts to make these important determinations. 
Should a strong creative work outweigh a small amount used? How do you 
fix how strong or weak a nature, purpose or effect are? Or, to complicate 
even further, how do you weigh a strong non-infringing purpose with a 
weak creative infringing nature and a small, but measurable, effect on the 
potential market? Does one strong factor outweigh two or three weak fac-
tors? As will be seen below, there is currently a mish-mash of analyses 
used by courts that do not address this underlying problem, but simply 
plow ahead and balance these factors loosely without any real solid logical 
basis for the weighing. 
B. The New Framework 
In light of this inherent problem, a new approach to fair use is needed. 
This article seeks to offer that new approach by designing a simple, yet 
complete, framework within which the factors can be appropriately bal-
anced with significant leeway for litigants to argue for or against any par-
ticular factor. This quantitative approach to fair use still uses elements of 
qualitative analysis. The qualitative reasoning employed for each fair use 
factor is then converted to a number value. The number values assigned to 
each factor correlates with the relative strength each factor has for or 
against fair use. In other words, the number values attached to each factor 
 
Century: Use of the Mail Fraud Statute Against Authors, 67 B.U. L. REV. 507, 536 (1987) (“[t]he 
balancing test is nothing more than a result-oriented test without any underlying principles for lower 
courts to use.”).   
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are still up for vigorous debate, but once those number values are deter-
mined, the framework provides a firm and discrete answer to the issue of 
fair use. 
To be clear, this framework is not intended to announce a new basis 
for finding fair use or to replace existing interpretations of copyright law, 
but instead is intended to complement it. Its purpose is to reflect, rather 
than change, the prevailing legal views on fair use. Reforming the analytic 
process of fair use can help to bring uniformity to fair use decisions and 
bring some level of predictability into the fair use equation. The key in any 
well-drafted precedential judicial decision is not so much the final out-
come, but rather the roadmap used to arrive at the verdict. 
With that constraint in mind, we proceed to the explanation of the new 
approach to fair use. At bottom, a recognition that no factor is elevated in 
importance by Section 107 is a beginning underlying assumption in this 
proposal. The foundational underlying assumption inherent in this frame-
work is the directive in Campbell that all factors should be considered 
equally and the results should be weighed together.110 This might be contra-
ry to actual practice, in that the first and fourth factors are highly correlated 
with the overall finding of fair use.111 But, as will be seen, the framework 
proposed herein would not necessarily deviate from those correlations, all 
other things being equal. 
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 110. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994). 
 111. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 
U. PA. L. REV. 549, 582–86 (2008). 
 112. For ease of reference, these factors hereinafter will be labeled, “purpose”, “nature”, “amount”, 
and “effect”. 
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likely fair use is a successful defense. The higher number grades represent 
a finding that would negate fair use. In most cases, there is not a clear-cut, 
definitive answer for any of these. Often, for example, an infringing use 
may have some elements of commercial and educational uses together. 
And, not all transformations of original works are equal – some are slightly 
transformational while others make more wholesale changes. As it stands 
now, courts are forced to make a murky, vague determination that the pur-
pose, for example, weighs in favor of one side or the other without taking 
into account that some purposes are stronger than others. 
Each of the four fair use factors receives a grade ranging from 1-4. A 
grade of 1 or 4 indicates a strong non-infringing or infringing finding, re-
spectively. Alternatively, factors in which both infringing and non-
infringing elements are present now have a way to be accurately described. 
A grade of 2 means that while the factor is predominately non-infringing, 
there is some aspect of the use that has an infringing character. The oppo-
site is true for a grade of 3. 
This framework introduces the concept of a continuum-based ap-
proach to fair use that recognizes that not all purposes, natures, amounts 
and effects are definitively infringing or non-infringing. It allows triers of 
fact to incorporate, for example, multiple purposes in the fair use analysis. 
This crucial piece is missing from much of the analysis in the jurispru-
dence. Quite simply, a strong infringing purpose should have more weight 
than a weak infringing purpose. This framework allows the trier of fact to 
make that qualitative judgment as to the intensity of each factor and then 
weigh each factor accordingly. Importantly, the framework ensures all 
factors are considered, rather than having the purpose of the use single-
handedly control the outcome. The danger that is ever present within the 
current way fair use decisions are adjudged is that those factors that do not 
comport with the final fair use determination will either be, at best, mini-
mized or at worst, ignored. This framework allows all factors, even those 
adverse to the final decision, to be fully considered. 
C. How the Framework Works 
The new approach to fair use allows triers of fact to examine each of 
the four fair use factors and give grades on a continuum that represent their 
relative strength or weakness in the fair use context. In light of this, a grade 
of “1” indicates the strongest non-infringing purpose. These are situations 
where the works are highly transformative and with a non-commercial use. 
For example, a court has leeway to give a “1” grade to those highly trans-
formative works if the transformation is so overwhelming that it trumps 
whether or not the purpose also has a commercial element. Thus, courts can 
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still emphasize and follow Campbell by assigning a grade of “1” for the 
purpose where a significant transformative use is found. Or, a grade of “1” 
would be assigned for the amount when the subsequent work uses the en-
tirety of the original.113 
A grade of “2” recognizes that while a use may be transformative 
and/or educational, it is not overwhelming. This would apply where per-
haps the transformative use still retained some elements of the original, or 
where the commercial purpose of the use does not totally counteract the 
transformational nature of the new work. A grade of “2” still leans towards 
a finding of fair use, but distinguishes those uses that are not transformative 
in the extreme. 
A grade of “3” indicates a weak finding of infringement. This would 
apply in a situation where a musician writes an educational song for chil-
dren whose lyrics are all 50 states and capitals. While songs are inherently 
creative114, given the musical accompaniment and the arrangement of the 
lyrics, the states and capitals themselves are merely informational and do 
not require any creativity whatsoever. A grade of “3” might be appropriate 
for the nature of the copyrighted work where the lyrics are predominately 
informational but the overall beat and music of the song is creative. 
Finally, a grade of “4” demonstrates a strong infringing use. In the 
A&M Records case, Napster users were engaging in massive copyright 
infringement to obtain copyrighted music without having to buy it through 
the marketplace.115 Clearly, this had a palpable effect on music sales; when 
music can be obtained for free on the Internet, these users no longer have 
the incentive to legally purchase this same music that, but for the presence 
of the illegal peer-to-peer file sharing service, customers would otherwise 
buy. Such illegal downloads clearly diminish the value of the copyrighted 
work and reduce the total revenue authors would normally receive for use 
of their works. Consequently, a trier of fact could assign a grade of “4” 
under effect. 
These grades are not and cannot always be objectively fixed. In many 
instances, the litigants will have to argue between one of two grades, such 
as whether or not the transformative use of the second work is weak or 
strong, thereby justifying a “1” or a “2”. This is really no different from the 
analysis as it stands now, but it allows the litigants to avoid having to play 
 
 113.  A grade of “1” also applies for the nature and effect, where the nature of the work is very 
creative or where there is little to no effect on the value of the work in the potential market. To avoid 
duplicity, the discussion of the grades hereinafter will be limited to a few examples rather than a redun-
dant and/or obvious discussion of how each grade could apply to each factor.  
 114. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586; Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g., 512 F.3d 522, 531 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
 115. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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a zero-sum game of arguing each factor either being in its favor or against 
it. Instead, a litigant may be able to accurately and more persuasively con-
cede that, for example, the amount taken was substantial and the factor 
works against him, but instead the grade should only be a “3” rather than a 
“4”. 
After assigning the grades for each row, the next step is to simply add 
the numerical grades.116 The dividing line between infringement and fair 
use is 10.117 Therefore, any sum that is less than 10 indicates that the fair 
use defense should be successful and the defendant should be allowed to 
continue to use the copyrighted work. A sum greater than 10 negates the 
fair use defense and indicates the defendant has infringed on the plaintiff’s 
original work. Importantly, once the analysis of each row and grade as-
signment has been completed, no further interpretation should occur. The 
numbers are what they are, so to speak, and whatever final value is elicited 
mandates a finding either for or against fair use. This system allows an 
effective balancing of the four factors and allows for the intensity of each 
of these factors to be taken into account. 
This, of course, begs the question of how to resolve the dispute if the 
sum of the four factors is exactly 10. A tiebreaker method should be em-
ployed to reach a conclusion for sums of 10. It is true that a variety of dif-
ferent tiebreakers could be used.118 However, the method that best 
comports with Campbell involves simply to make the purpose the tiebreak-
ing factor.119 There is no doubt that Campbell stressed the relative im-
portance of transformative uses over other factors.120 Therefore, when the 
final result is 10, whichever litigant “wins” the purpose analysis wins the 
case. In other words, for those sums that equal 10, when the purpose grade 
 
 116.  So, if the trier of fact assigns a grade of “2” for purpose, “3” for nature, “2” for amount and 
“1” for effect, the sum would be 8.  
 117. 10 is simply the breakeven point. The average grade assignable for each column is 2.5. There 
are four different rows to be assigned, so that the average total score is 10. 
 118.  For example, if 3 of 4 factors weigh in one direction, the tiebreaker could be given to the side 
with three factors. This would apply in a 3-3-3-1 or 2-2-2-4 split, with the side earning the 3s or 2s 
respectively winning. Or, a tiebreaker could be given to the side that has the most 1s or 4s, arguing that 
a side with extreme strong infringing or non-infringing uses should be given the benefit of the doubt.  
 119. It could be argued that factor 4, the effect, and not the purpose is more appropriately the 
tiebreaking factor in light of the Supreme Court’s declaration in Harper & Row,  that the fourth factor is 
the most important fair use factor. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 539–
42 (1985). However, in light of Campbell’s subtle rejection of Harper & Row’s reliance on the fourth 
factor and the elevation of the transformative purpose as the key factor, it makes more sense to give 
special tiebreaking privileges to the fourth factor. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583–84. 
 120. Specifically, transformative uses are at the “heart” of fair use’s protections and the more 
transformative a work is, the less other factors are significant. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. Therefore, if 
a finding on one factor leads to a finding that others are less significant, the first factor is of greater 
relative importance.  
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is “1” or “2”, the result is a finding of fair use. When the purpose grade is a 
“3” or a “4”, the result is that fair use is negated as a defense. 
The tiebreaking procedure has the extra benefit of staying true to the 
jurisprudence while at the same time achieving the equalized balancing 
test. As noted by Netanel, lower courts have consistently, whether con-
sciously or not, interpreted Campbell as a directive to elevate the purpose 
of the use as one of greater importance.121 It certainly appears that the em-
phasis placed on the purpose may be too extreme, given the correlation 
between winning the purpose argument and wining the overall fair use 
debate. At the end of the day, Campbell still stressed that all factors are to 
be explored and weighed. The method used here allows the purpose to still 
have greater impact than the others, given the possibility that the outcome 
might be exactly ten,122 while at the same time not giving the purpose such 
an enormous advantage so that it overshadows the other three factors. 
The framework endorsed herein allows results to occur that might not 
be reached otherwise. Suppose a trier of fact completes the analysis and 
reaches a 3-4-1-1 result. The result is 9, meaning fair use should be found. 
But, if too much emphasis is placed on purpose, it is quite possible that the 
trier of fact will simply see a 2-2 split, see purpose as the important factor, 
and find for the plaintiff on infringement.123 Or, in a case where the result is 
a 4-2-2-2 (a result of 10), the balancing test might be applied to reach a 
conclusion of fair use since 3 factors weigh in favor of fair use while only 
one does not. Such an analysis would not consider the relative strength and 
weakness of the factors. Given that the purpose is more important and is 
the tiebreaker, the fact the purpose is a 4 would hand a victory over to the 
plaintiff and negate a finding of fair use. 
Certainly, other methods could be used to create similar frameworks, 
but other options either lack simplicity or consistency with Campbell. For 
example, a scale of 1-10, instead of 1-4 could be used, giving the trier of 
fact greater specificity to pinpoint the exact degree of infringement.124 But, 
the problem dealing with such minute increments is the inability to really 
 
 121. Netanel found a substantial increase in fair use findings when the court analyzing the case 
found a transformative use as enunciated in Campbell – this was in line with the recent general trend to 
discuss and analyze the case using a transformative use when analyzing the purpose. See Netanel, supra 
note 55, at 740. 
 122. There are quite a few combinations that equal 10, such as 3-3-3-1, 4-3-2-1, 4-2-2-2, 4-4-1-1, 
and 3-3-2-2.  
 123. A similar outcome might be reached on a 1-4-4-4- split. If a trier of fact simply blindly sees a 
strong transformative use and relies on Campbell for the proposition that a transformative use should be 
given special consideration, the result would be a finding of fair use and thereby totally disregarding the 
strength of the other three factors in favor of infringement.  
 124. Or, a system of decimals could be used in the standard 1-4 framework, so that, for example, a 
1.5 could be assigned. In reality, that is no different from the 1-10 system and suffers from the same 
drawback. 
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be able to put objective grades on subjective factors. How can one really 
discern the difference between a grade of 7 and 8? Such small increments 
are really not distinguishable when dealing with, for example, the nature of 
the use. On the other hand, the simpler strong/weak dichotomy is some-
thing that is easily distinguishable and intuitive. The goal herein is to make 
a framework that simplifies rather than complicates the trier of fact’s deci-
sion. 
Another possibility is to emphasize either the first or fourth factors, or 
both, within the confines of the framework itself. So, for example, the pos-
sible grades for purpose could be -1, 0, 5, or 6, with 1-4 for the other three 
factors.125 This would augment the relative importance of the first factor by 
giving purpose a more extreme range of points that can be assigned. The 
justification behind such a system would be the importance placed on trans-
formative use in the jurisprudence; however, this system suffers from the 
fatal flaw of not staying true to Campbell’s holding that the four factors 
should be weighed together. The purpose still has some extra prominence 
in that it is a tiebreaker, but giving it additional weight strays too far from 
the core holding of Campbell. 
III. APPLICATION 
Applying this new analysis to already rendered decisions shows how 
effective the framework is. In many cases, the framework confirms the 
Court’s decision and would have given the Court a firmer legal basis from 
which to render a decision. As will be seen, there are cases that quite possi-
bly would have been decided differently had this method been utilized. In 
the analysis used below, it is important to note that the author may have to 
make some independent judgment when the facts or the court’s reasoning 
could support two different grades. 
A. Hofheinz v. A&E 
In Hofheinz v. A & E Television Networks, the copyright holders of the 
film “It Conquered the World”, starring Peter Graves, sued A&E and its 
program “Biography.” “Biography” features an hour-long biographical 
feature on a particular celebrity.126 On this particular episode, “Biography” 
featured Peter Graves and in doing so, aired a portion of “It Conquered the 
 
 125. The breakeven point would remain 10 in such a system. However, a finding of a noninfringing 
purpose would reduce the overall sum and require higher grades from the other three factors to reach 
10. So, in the standard system, a score of 1-3-3-4 would be infringing, while in this system a score of (-
1)-3-3-4 would equal 9 and a finding of fair use.  
 126.  Hofheinz v. A & E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d 442, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
130 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [Vol 14:1 
World,” without permission, to illustrate some of his earlier works.127 In an 
interview with Graves aired on the program, he implies that “It Conquered 
the World” was not a serious film and was a part that he took to “buy the 
groceries.”128 This episode of “Biography” was 44 minutes long and used 
20 seconds of various scenes from “It Conquered the World.”129 “It Con-
quered the World” lasts approximately 70 minutes.130 Additionally, the film 
was no longer available through video rental, but plaintiff did rent it for 
special showings and film festivals. 131 
The District Court examined all four fair use factors and made a 
judgment as to how all four weighed, even including a discussion of 
whether or not the factors weighed “slightly” one way or the other. First, 
the Court found that A&E’s use of the film was transformative in that the 
purpose of A&E’s use was to provide details in a biography, whereas the 
original was intended for theatrical entertainment.132 As a result, the Court 
found that the purpose of the use “tips in favor of A&E.”133 The Court did 
not discuss the commerciality of the use, instead opting to rely solely on 
the transformative nature of the work. In light of the commercial context of 
the film - it was shown on a for-profit network – a grade of “2” is appropri-
ate. 
Next, the Court stated that “It Conquered the World” is certainly a 
creative work and thus the factor “tipped slightly” in favor of the plain-
tiff.134 The Court justified weighing this factor only slightly towards the 
plaintiff because the work was out of circulation. In light of this, a grade of 
“3” is appropriate. 
As for the amount, the Court emphasized that less than 1% of the film 
was used and the 20 seconds of film was cut in such a way to make it virtu-
ally impossible to follow along with the film’s plot.135 The Court found that 
the factor “cuts in defendants’ favor.”136 Since such a small and insubstan-
tial portion of the film was used, a grade of “1” is appropriate. 
 
 127. Id. at 443 “It Conquered the World” was a science fiction film where Peter Graves played the 
role of a scientist.  
 128. Id. at 444. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. at 444–45. 
 132. Id. at 446. As the Court succinctly stated, “The 20 seconds of footage shown of that appear-
ance in defendants’ biography was not shown to recreate the creative expression reposing in plaintiff’s 
film, it was for the transformative purpose of enabling the viewer to understand the actor’s modest 
beginnings in the film business.” Id. at 446–47. 
 133. Id. at 446–47. 
 134. Id. at 447. 
 135. Id. at 448. 
 136. Id. 
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Finally, the Court reasoned that because the movie was not available 
for mass rental, nor was the 20 second clip a substitute for the original, the 
airing on “Biography” did not affect the market for the film.137 As a result, 
the Court found that this factor “favors A&E as well.”138 So, given the total 
lack of evidence in favor of the plaintiff on this point, a “1” should be as-
signed for effect. 
Adding all of the number values leads to a sum of 7, meaning A&E’s 
use of this clip was a fair use.139 This confirms the ruling of the Court. In-
terestingly, the Court implicitly recognized the need to not only balance the 
factors together, but to also consider their intensity by using words such as 
“tips” and “slightly” when making the fair use determination. As the 
Court’s opinion reads, it is simply unclear as to how the Court makes the 
jump from the analysis of the factors to the end conclusion. The Court 
merely lays out the factors and then, without any further discussion, grants 
A&E’s motion for summary judgment without explaining how all four 
factors relate. This article’s proposed framework provides that missing, but 
crucial, analytical piece that justifies the finding of fair use. 
B. Associated Press v. Meltwater 
The case of Associated Press v. Meltwater involves a situation where 
the Court held the fair use defense did not apply.140 The Associated Press 
(AP) is a news organization that produces between 1,000 and 2,000 news 
articles.141 The AP then licenses these articles to third parties who dissemi-
nate them through various online outlets.142 Defendant Meltwater is a news 
monitoring service with 4,000 U.S. customers.143 Meltwater’s service oper-
ated as a kind of search engine where users could search for key terms in 
news articles.144 Meltwater’s system would then copy news articles, includ-
ing AP articles, and deliver the articles to their subscribers.145 Although 
only excerpts of news articles were copied and provided to subscribers, as 
much as 60 percent of a given article could have been copied.146 Its design 
was to provide a “news clipping” service that allowed users to see only the 
 
 137. Id. at 449. 
 138. Id. 
 139. 2+3+1+1=7. 
 140.  Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
 141. Id. at 541. 
 142. Id. at 542. 
 143. Id. at 543. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 546. 
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pertinent part of the article rather than having to read an entire article to 
glean the desired parts.147 
The Court proceeded to balance the four fair use factors. The Court 
found that Meltwater’s use was not transformative. Meltwater’s search 
engine was designed to deliver news to its subscribers, but only those ex-
cerpts that were germane to that user.148 Meltwater added no commentary 
or insight into the AP stories, but instead copied them verbatim.149Meltwa-
ter’s purpose behind providing this material to its users was the same as 
AP’s purpose – to convey news and information to its users. Instead, the 
Court found that Meltwater “repackages,” rather than transforms, the origi-
nal work.150 Given the Meltwater’s use was not transformative and that 
Meltwater is a commercial, for-profit enterprise, a grade of “4” is assigned 
for the purpose. 
As for the nature of the copyrighted work, the Court admitted that the 
news stories were both factual and published and as a result found that the 
factor weighed in favor of fair use.151 The Court cited Nihon v. Comline152 
for the proposition that this factor is “at most neutral on the question of fair 
use.”153 This proposition runs wholly contrary to the notion of a balancing 
test and is certainly unsupported by Supreme Court jurisprudence. The 
nature of the work is just as important in the proposed framework and 
should be considered equally. Consequently, a grade of “1” is assigned for 
the nature, since there is little creativity in the AP news articles. 
For the amount, the Court discussed both the qualitative and quantita-
tive copying. Meltwater never copied the entire story, which would have 
defeated the purpose of Meltwater’s service. Instead, it copied anywhere 
from 4.5 to 60 percent of any given article.154 Additionally, Meltwater al-
ways took the lede of every article it copied, which the Court described as 
the heart of the story.155 The Court found that this factor “weighs strongly 
against a finding of fair use”.156 As such, a grade of “4” is appropriate.157 
 
 147. Id. at 554. 
 148. Id. at 552. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 556. 
 151. Id. at 557. 
 152. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 153. Associated Press, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 557. 
 154. Id. at 558. 
 155. Id. The lede is the opening sentence of any AP article and takes some journalistic creativity to 
write.  
 156. Id.  
 157.  This article seeks to follow the Court’s reasoning as much as possible, and here, the Court 
leaves little doubt that it believes the amount factor is a strong infringing factor worthy of a grade of 
“4”. However, in light of the fact that nowhere near all of the work was copied, a grade of “3” might 
have been easier to justify. Additionally, while the lede is certainly creative, it is hard to say that the 
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Lastly, the Court found the effect factor weighed strongly against a 
finding of fair use. AP and Meltwater are essentially competitors, and 
Meltwater does not license AP’s work to distribute to its users like other 
third party websites.158 Meltwater obtained an “unfair commercial ad-
vantage” by not licensing these copyrighted work, which is how AP derives 
a large amount of its revenue.159 So, a grade of “4” is appropriate for the 
effect. 
Adding the grades together gives a sum of 13, meaning fair use is not 
available to Meltwater.160 This comports with the Court’s ruling, but the 
proposed framework allows the Court to dispense with the silly notion that 
one factor, the nature, is neutral at best. Credit can still be given for the 
informational nature of the work without having to worry that the overall 
calculus will be skewed in the wrong direction. 
C. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc. 
The plaintiff, Derek Seltzer, is an artist that created a work entitled 
“Scream Icon” in 2003.161 It is a very distinctive picture of a “screaming, 
contorted face.”162 Many copies of Scream Icon have been placed on walls 
in Los Angeles as graffiti or street art.163 In 2008, Roger Staub, the video 
designer for Green Day, took a picture of a weathered copy of Scream Icon 
found on a brick wall.164 Later, Staub used the picture of Scream Icon in a 
4-minue video for one of Green Day’s songs, “East Jesus Nowhere.” Alt-
hough it is slightly modified from its original form in the video, it remains 
clearly identifiable and is present in the middle of the screen in the video 
and stays throughout the entire video.165 The video was played as a back-
drop at seventy Green Day concerts in 2009.166 The following copyright 
infringement litigation ensued. 
The Court found that the purpose of the use weighed in Green Day’s 
favor. The Court found that the use of Scream Icon in the video was trans-
formative in that the picture was used as part of Green Day’s video to illus-
trate notions of religious hypocrisy, whereas the original was a reflection of 
 
opening sentence of any article is always going to be the most important part. As Meltwater’s system 
illustrates, the important parts of the article depend on the user reading it.  
 158. Id. at 561. 
 159. Id. 
 160. 4+1+4+4=13. 
 161. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. (Green Day is a famous and successful rock band). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
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“youth culture.”167 The Court relied on the fact that there was a new ex-
pressive content or message with Green Day’s use and that Green Day 
transformed its original content to one that expresses outrage towards reli-
gion.168 Further, the Court found that the use of the work in the video back-
drop was only “incidentally commercial,” since there was no direct profit 
or revenue gained from the use of the video.169 This is a close call on the 
grade to be assigned, but since the work was not overly transformative and 
was still slightly commercial a grade of “2” is to be assigned. 
However, it could be contended that there is little transformation in 
this at all – both were used as works of creative expression, and what the 
expressive content behind its use within or without the video is arbitrary at 
best. The Scream Icon is still readily identifiable throughout the video and 
is being used to promote some artistic expression and not for a totally dif-
ferent purpose, such as news reporting. Thus, the author contends that, 
under these facts, a grade of “3” for purpose is more appropriate. 
Next, the Court left little doubt that Scream Icon was extremely crea-
tive, but mitigated this finding given that the work had already been pub-
lished and widely disseminated prior to it being used by Green Day.170 As a 
result, this factor weighed “slightly” in Seltzer’s favor and thus a grade of 
“3” is appropriate.171 
Third, the Court found that the amount factor did not weigh against 
Green Day because the picture is incapable of being divisible.172 Since 
Green Day necessarily needed to take the entire original to make its point, 
it took no more than was necessary. A grade of “2” is given for the amount 
factor, since the entirety of the work was appropriated. 
This grade is very debatable. The Court seems to confuse parody and 
non-parody. For parody, the second work by its very nature takes some of 
the original in order to cast a humorous slant towards the original.173 Here, 
Green Day was not parodying or satirizing the original, so there was no 
longer any need to reference back to the original. In the author’s view, a 
grade of “4” would be more appropriate given that the entire work was 
taken. 
 
 167. Id. at 1177. 
 168. Id. This finding presumes that there is some objective basis with which to determine what the 
exact expressive message is inherent in a work of art. It further presumes that the artist, and not the 
viewer, determines what the expressive meaning of a work of art is. Who is to say, for example, that a 
viewer of Scream Icon also could not have interpreted it as a diatribe against religion, just as Roger 
Staub apparently did? 
 169. Id. at 1178. 
 170. Id.  
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1178–79. 
 173. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 599-600 (1994). 
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For the effect, the Court found that Scream Icon lost none of its mar-
ket value and Green Day never used Scream Icon as part of its merchan-
dise, albums, or promotional materials.174 Thus, the Court found that the 
fourth factor weighed in Green Day’s favor and a grade of “1” is appropri-
ate given the total lack of evidence that this use affected the potential value 
of Scream Icon.175 
The final grade is “8.”176 Once again, the proposed framework con-
firms the Court’s finding of fair use. The Court noted that Green Day did 
not win on all four factors, but did emphasize that it did win on both the 
first and fourth factors, which are “generally viewed as the most important 
factors”.177 Once again, the factors should be balanced and Campbell 
stresses no one factor is more important than the others. Without a frame-
work as the one proposed, however, it is very difficult to conceptualize 
how these factors weigh against each other and is very easy to fall into the 
trap of emphasizing the factors that best support the result reached. Using 
this framework eliminates that analytical pitfall and allows for a more rea-
soned approach. 
On the other hand, if the author’s interpretation of the amount factor 
were used – giving the amount a grade of “4” instead of “2”, the result 
would be 10. In that case, the tiebreaker would be the purpose, which was 
found to be in favor of a finding of fair use. If both the purpose and the 
amount were changed to reflect the author’s reasonable views, the sum 
would be 11 (3-3-4-1) and there would be a finding of infringement. So, it 
is clear that the way in which a court accepts or discards reasonable inter-
pretations of the factors goes a long way to the ultimate determination of 
fair use. 
D. Gaylord v. U.S. 
Plaintiff Frank Gaylord, a sculptor, created a work of art called The 
Column to honor veterans of the Korean War.178 The sculpture consisted of 
19 life-sized stainless steel soldiers arranged in a unique formation and was 
part of an official government memorial for Korean War veterans.179 Later, 
the United States Postal Service issued a stamp commemorating the Korean 
 
 174. Seltzer, 725 F. 3d. at 1179.  
 175. If anything, Green Day’s use of Scream Icon might actually have a positive impact on the 
value of the work, since Seltzer’s work is being seen by people who otherwise might not have been 
aware of its existence.  
 176. 2+3+2+1=8. 
 177. Id. at 1180. 
 178. Gaylord v. U.S., 595 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 179. Id. 
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War that featured Mr. Gaylord’s sculpture.180 The stamp showed the actual 
sculpture, including 14 of the 19 soldiers, taken during a snowstorm.181 The 
Postal Service generated nearly 17 million dollars in sales from this stamp, 
5.4 million of which came from collectors that never used the stamp for 
postage.182 Mr. Gaylord sued the Postal Service for copyright infringement. 
The lower court in the case found that the Postal Service’s incorpora-
tion of The Column in its stamp was a fair use, but that holding was re-
versed on appeal.183 The Court disagreed with the lower court that the 
purpose of the use was transformative. The lower court found that since the 
stamp featured subdued lighting and the added effect of the snowstorm, it 
added a “surreal” expression to the work that was not present in the origi-
nal.184 The Court noted that the stamp was not being used as part of a bio-
graphical work that would present a more transformative use; instead, the 
Court found that the intrinsic purpose of both The Column and the stamp 
was to “honor veterans of the Korean War.”185 Also, the Court found that 
the since the Postal Service generated 17 million dollars, the stamp “clearly 
has a commercial purpose”.186 Combining these two findings, the Court 
found that the purpose “strongly” weighed against fair use, and consequent-
ly, a grade of “4” is assigned. 
Next, the Court found that the sculpture was “expressive and crea-
tive”, but since the work had been published, this factor simply weighed 
against fair use.187 Therefore, a grade of “3” should be assigned. As for the 
amount factor, only 14 of the 19 statutes were used in the stamp, the stamp 
including the focus of The Column. This factor weighed against fair use 
and thus a grade of “3” is assigned188 Although this is a closer call, a grade 
of “3” takes into account that not all of The Column was used in the stamp. 
As for the effect, the Court agreed with the lower court and found that 
this factor weighed in favor of fair use. Even Mr. Gaylord admitted that the 
stamp actually increased the visibility and popularity, rather than dimin-
ished, the value of his work.189 The stamp and the actual sculptures were 
 
 180. Id. at 1370. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 1371.  
 183. As this was a suit against the government, the lower court in this case was the Court of Federal 
Claims.  
 184. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1373. 
 185. Id. Further, the Court was not persuaded that the snowstorm had any effect on the purpose of 
the use, stating, “[n]ature’s decision to snow cannot deprive Mr. Gaylord of an otherwise valid right to 
exclude.” Id. at 1374. 
 186. Id. at 1374.  
 187. Id.  
 188. Id. at 1375. 
 189. Id. 
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not market substitutes and thus no effect on the stamp’s value occurred 
because of the infringement.190 So, with no market impact, a grade of “1” is 
assigned. 
Therefore, the stamp’s use of The Column has a total grade of 11, con-
firming the finding of infringement.191 The Court held, “Weighing the fac-
tors, we conclude that the government’s use of The Column in the stamp 
was not a fair use.”192 And, that was it. The weighing/balancing done by the 
Court consisted of an astounding one sentence, without any mention of 
how the intensity of the factors mix, nor a discussion of why a total lack of 
market impact does not mandate a fair use finding. Notably, had the Court 
adopted the lower court’s finding on purpose, the result would have been 
different. A finding of a “1” or a “2” for purpose reduces the final score 
below 9, and illustrates the point of how a variance in simply one factor can 
change the entire balancing test. 
E. Warren Publishing v. Spurlock193 
Plaintiff James Warren published a variety of magazines devoted to 
movie monsters in the 1950s and 1960s.194 Warren commissioned several 
artists to design the covers for his magazine, including Basil Gogos.195 
Gogos designed nearly 50 covers of the magazine, more than any other 
artist.196 Defendant Spurlock decided in 2004 to publish a book on the life 
of Basil Gogos and approached Warren to inquire on a possible collabora-
tive project; however, no deal was ever reached.197 Even though negotia-
tions fell through, Spurlock used at least 24 of Gogos’ magazine covers in 
his book to illustrate the Gogos’ life, ten of which were exact reproduc-
tions.198 Warren filed suit for copyright infringement, with Spurlock argu-
ing this was a fair use of plaintiff’s work.199 
For the purpose of the use, the Court found that Spurlock ultimately 
did transform the original. However, the Court noted that this was not 
clear-cut, given that Spurlock made exact reproductions of the original in 
 
 190. Id. To support this conclusion, the Court surmises that the fans of the stamp would not cease 
to take photographs of The Column simply because they already have a stamp with a depiction of it. 
 191.  4+3+3+1=11. 
 192. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1376. 
 193. Warren Publ’g. Co. v. Spurlock, 645 F. Supp. 2d 402, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
 194. Id. at 405. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 406. 
 198. Id. For purposes of summary judgment, Spurlock conceded that Warren owned the copyrights 
in all of Gogos’ magazine covers. 
 199.  Id at 411. 
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an effort to improve his commercial book.200 At the end of the day, the 
Court rested its conclusion on the fact that the original work was used to 
sell movie monster magazines, while the second use was to illustrate a 
biographical account of the evolution of his work “in order to pay homage 
to his accomplishments.”201 As a result, the Court found that the purpose of 
the use was transformative and “weigh heavily in favor of Spurlock”, de-
spite the fact that the Court began its fair use discussion noting that there 
were some characteristics of the use that did not support fair use.202 
This is an excellent example of where the proposed framework would 
be very helpful to elucidate the Court’s opinion. The Court’s statements 
seem contradictory. It is hard to imagine how the purpose of the use could 
weigh “heavily” in favor of Spurlock when the Court openly admitted that 
some of the evidence points in Warren’s favor. Had the Court been able to 
assign a grade, the litigants would have had no doubt determining the exact 
factual finding on purpose – as it currently stands, it is unclear at best. Giv-
en that some characteristics lean towards a finding of infringement, a grade 
of “2” is assigned.203 
For the nature, the Court found that the original artwork is certainly 
creative, and this creative nature was not undermined by the fact that the 
magazine covers were long since out-of-print.204 Here, though, the Court 
found that, “this factor weighs slightly in favor of Plaintiffs, but it is of 
limited relevance because of the prior finding that Spurlock’s work is trans-
formative.”205 This analysis is backwards – the Court balanced the factors 
together before the actual grade was awarded. The assigning of grades or 
determination of the four factors should be independently judged, given 
Campbell’s instruction that the four factors should be balanced equally. 
Once again, the proposed framework corrects this potential error in analysis 
by allowing the trier of fact to assign grades first, and then allow the 
framework to objectively balance the factors. Here, the appropriate grade 
for the nature should be a “4”, despite the Court’s declaration that the na-
ture only weighed “slightly” in plaintiff’s favor. Otherwise, arguing that the 
nature weighs slightly in favor of infringement because of the finding on 
purpose does not allow for proper balancing. Analyzing the factors that 
 
 200. Id. at 418. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 422. 
 203. Admittedly, the Court may very well have intended a grade of “1”, but such a grade should be 
reserved only for those findings where all signs point to fair use.  
 204. Warren Publ’g. Co. 645 F. Supp. 2d at 423. The Court noted that, as a periodical, the maga-
zines themselves have a limited time of demand, thus the fact that each is technically “out-of-print” is 
not relevant to the question for the nature of the work. Id. 
 205. Id. 
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way allows the purpose to effectively subsume and control the nature, de-
parting from the Supreme Court’s intent in Campbell. 
For the amount, the Court was persuaded by Spurlock’s argument that 
the magazine covers consisted of 1 to 1.5 percent of the total material in the 
magazine, which was a relatively miniscule amount.206 Further, the heart of 
the work was not the covers, according to the Court, but rather the content 
of the magazines.207 Having found that neither the qualitative nor quantita-
tive aspect of the third factor favored infringement, the Court ruled that the 
third factor weighed “in favor of Spurlock.”208 In light of this finding, a 
grade of “1” should be assigned. 
For the effect, the Court found that it weighed “slightly” in favor of 
plaintiffs, but only because there was a genuine issue of material fact raised 
by Warren as to the potential impact on the value of the work or future 
derivative works.209 Warren contended that he intended on creating a cof-
fee-table book that would detail the history of monster magazines, which 
would utilize some of the Gogos magazine covers.210 According to plain-
tiff’s experts, the Gogos book could be a market substitute for his future 
book, or, if the Gogos book performed poorly, could “poison” the market 
for his coffee table book.211 Given the uncertainty of these factual asser-
tions, for purposes of summary judgment, the Court found that these were 
possible market impacts and found that the effect factor weighed “slightly” 
in favor of Warren.212 As a slight effect only, a grade of “3” should be as-
signed. 
Adding the sums up leaves a grade of “10”, which is of course a tie.213 
The tiebreaker to be used is the purpose. Since the purpose effect was de-
 
 206. Id. at 424. The Court rejected Warren’s argument that each of the magazine covers constituted 
a separate copyrightable work, meaning that Spurlock would have taken 100 percent of the work when 
he made exact reproductions. That argument has some force given that the magazine cover is a distinct 
work of art apart from the rest of the work. However, unlike in Harper & Row, where the excerpts 
taken from the unpublished memoirs were part and parcel of the entire work, the magazine covers have 
a unique and distinct character. Id. at 427. The covers were designed by artists such as Gogos and the 
rest of the magazine was presumably created by someone else. Id. at 406. Regardless, the Court does 
have a justifiable basis for reasoning that the amount was relatively small. 
 207. Id. at 424.  
 208. Id. Curiously, the Court did not find that this factor weighed “heavily” or “strongly”, even 
though both aspects of the amount factor weighed substantially in Spurlock’s favor. 
 209. Id. at 428. 
 210. Id. at 425.  
 211. Id. at 427.  
 212. Id. at 428. The effect was only “slightly” in favor of Warren because Warren’s neglect to 
make this book for 22 years cast serious doubt on his intent to actually write and/or sell this book. Id. at 
423.   
 213. 2+4+1+3=10. 
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termined to be in favor of Spurlock, the end result is fair use.214 The 
framework allows for the factors to be appropriately balanced and, as the 
saying goes, “let the chips fall where they may”. The fair use finding was 
still confirmed, but using this framework allows a court to more objectively 
and qualitatively reach its conclusion without making vague assertions that 
it “weighed the factors and considering the purposes of copyright”.215 Such 
vague platitudes allow a trier of fact to easily reach the result desired rather 
than allowing the process to logically flow to the conclusion. In the end, the 
Court’s decision is still confirmed by the framework, but it should be noted 
that this was an extremely close case that could have quite easily have gone 
the other way. If, for example, the Court had found that the magazine co-
vers were the heart of the magazines, thus justifying at least a “2” for the 
amount, this would have tipped the scales in favor of infringement. 
F. Sony v. Universal 
Next, the alleged copyright infringement in Sony offers insight as to 
how the analysis used in that decision may have looked strikingly different 
using this framework. The Court clearly found that the purpose of the use 
was both nonprofit and noncommercial.216 Specifically, the Court relied on 
the fact that private parties watching programming from the comfort of 
their own homes had no commercial use.217This case was decided before 
the transformative use doctrine was introduced, so the Court in Sony did 
not discuss it. However, it is hard to cError! Bookmark not de-
fined.onceive a way in which verbatim copying of a television show in any 
way transforms the original. It is the exact same program, watched on the 
same medium (television) for the same purpose (entertainment). Given that 
the emphasis on the transformative use of the work, and the fact that VTR 
copying simply does not transform the work, a grade of “3” or “4” seems 
reasonable. A “3” appears more apt, since the noncommercial purpose cer-
tainly does militate against a finding of a strong infringing purpose. 
As noted in Sony itself, the nature of the work and the amount used 
both tend towards a finding of infringement. Television shows are creative 
by their nature; on the other hand, sporting events and documentaries are 
not. Therefore, a grade of “3” seems appropriate to indicate a weak infring-
ing nature. The amount, on the other hand, is all of the work. A grade of 
 
 214. The purpose was a “2”, meaning that there was a weak finding in favor of fair use. Once 
again, for tiebreaking purposes, a “1” or a “2” grade in purpose gives the victory to the side arguing fair 
use, while a grade of “3” or “4” gives the victory to the side arguing infringement.  
 215. Id. at 428. 
 216. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984). 
 217. Had the Court rendered its ruling based solely on its commercial nature and on its transforma-
tive uses, there is little doubt the purpose would have received a grade of “1”. 
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“4” is appropriate for the amount. Finally, the Court noted that the effect of 
the VTR copying has no impact on the potential market or value of these 
works. Thus, a grade of “1” is appropriate. 
Adding all of these grades leaves a sum of 11.218 Thus, using this 
framework and the emphasis on the transformative use, a contrary result is 
reached from the Sony Court’s decision.219 Certainly, it is possible to envi-
sion a scenario where the Supreme Court, faced with the facts of Sony in a 
new case, could conceivably reverse itself on the fair use issue.220 
G. Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises 
The Harper & Row case is an even better illustration of how the 
framework could augment a court’s ruling. As for purpose, The Nation 
certainly did not transform the memoirs, but instead lifted them directly 
from Harper & Row’s copyrighted work.221 The Nation used it for the same 
news reporting purpose that Harper & Row would have used it.222 Also, 
given the reliance on the fact that The Nation stole these memoirs to use 
them, a grade of “4” seems appropriate. This comports with the Court’s 
overall view of the purpose.223 
Secondly, the facts in the memoirs themselves were not creative, but 
the most the expressive elements within the work were appropriated. Also, 
since this was an unpublished work, its nature was one that gives rise to 
higher copyright protection. A grade of a weak infringing “3” seems cor-
rect, which takes into account that the memoirs are facts and not overly 
creative. Next, the amount of the work taken was small; however, the im-
portant parts of the work were the ones The Nation used. Once again, a 
finding of “3” is assigned that takes into account both the amount and sub-
 
 218. 3+3+4+1=11. 
 219. However, should the Court’s reliance on the noncommercial purpose of the use be solely 
considered, a grade of “1” in purpose would leave a sum of “9”, meaning that fair use would apply.  
 220. It is important to note, though, that the Sony Court relied on two independent holdings to reach 
its conclusion that VTRs were not liable for contributory infringement. Id. at 455. The Court found that 
licensees of television programming have likely consented to time-shifting and that this was not a case 
of infringement at all. Id. at 443–446. Given that television users are paying for the right to watch a 
show one time, it makes no difference at what time the user actually watches the show. Thus, the argu-
ment goes that time-shifting is not infringement at all, thus making the fair use determination ultimately 
irrelevant.  
 221. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 539 (1985).  
 222. Id. at 561. 
 223. Certainly, a grade of “3” could be argued in that news reporting might be a noncommercial 
purpose. However, the Nation still is a for-profit company in the business of selling magazines and the 
overwhelmingly non-transformative use militates towards finding a “4”.  
142 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [Vol 14:1 
stantiality and at the same time coincides with the Court’s finding that this 
factor weighed against fair use.224 
Finally, the effect should be given a “4”. There was little doubt that 
Harper & Row’s copyrighted work was significantly less valuable when 
The Nation “scooped” it. In fact, Time Magazine refused to pay $12,000 
for the story once the information was out.225 Thus, a grade of “4” is appro-
priate. The sum of these grades is 14, which confirms the Court’s finding of 
infringement.226 
CONCLUSION 
A new approach to fair use is needed. Interpreting each of the four 
factors is difficult enough, but adding a requirement that these four distinct 
factors must be weighed together without any real objective basis makes it 
extraordinarily difficult to reach a decision that is objectively analytical. 
This lack of a real analytical process can easily give rise to accusations that 
the results drive the copyright bus. Even if such a sinister motive is not 
present, conceptualizing how different factors with different relative 
strengths balance or weigh against each other is tantamount to tilting at 
windmills. As seen, courts spend far more time interpreting the factors 
rather than balancing them. 
The proposed framework provides that analytical process and allows 
triers of fact to make factual findings as to the relative intensity of each of 
the factors and balance them in an objective, non-arbitrary manner. Allow-
ing the framework to produce the final determination allows a full and 
frank discussion of all four factors, including those that cut against the 
victorious side, rather than minimizing those that inconveniently do not 
favor the ultimate determination.  Often, the framework will produce the 
same result as the current method of analysis, but does so in an easy-to-
understand way that ensures the balancing takes place and all factors are 
considered. In other cases, the framework might actually reach an opposite 
conclusion, showing that the initial balancing of the four factors was either 
done incorrectly or incompletely. 
At the end of the day, the purpose behind this new framework is to 
bring clarity to legal decision-making. Its purpose is not to offer a new, 
wholesale shift in how fair use determinations are made. Rather, this 
framework seems to complement current fair use analysis by providing an 
objective basis from which to make decisions. Appellate courts would like-
 
 224. Once again, a “2” could realistically be argued, since such a small amount was used relative to 
the entire work.  
 225. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567. 
 226. 4+3+3+4=14. 
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ly prefer such analysis as well, as it clearly illustrates how the lower court 
made its decision. Litigants could then focus on particular factors from 
which to appeal on and could limit their fight on one or two grounds that 
might tip the scales in the opposite direction. All in all, using a clear, objec-
tive framework that logically produces a fair use determination benefits 
both courts and litigants alike. 
 
